I find that the introduction of the Euro was associated with an increase in the growth rate of physical investment of about five percentage points. The evidence is robust to a variety of controls and robustness checks. The effect of the Euro on investment is strongest immediately following its introduction in 1999, and tapers off by 2003. The effect appears to be equally strong for countries with high and low levels of financial development. The effect is stronger in industries that depend on external finance. I find no evidence that the introduction of the Euro increased the efficiency of capital allocation.
Introduction
There is overwhelming evidence that European financial markets are becoming more integrated, and that a great deal of this integration has been facilitated by the common currency (for a survey see Baele et al. (2004) or Cappiello et al. (2005) ). However, evidence that this integration has any real effect on resource allocation is scarce. Economists expect that financial integration will lead to more investment and to a more efficient allocation of capital. More investment is expected as a result of the lower cost of capital. More efficient allocation of capital is expected because integrated financial markets should be better at identifying investment opportunities. Financial integration is not an end in itself but rather a means to achieve higher economic growth. Greater investment and its more efficient allocation are the two principal channels through which financial integration will lead to growth. The purpose of this paper is to investigate these two channels. Specifically, I ask whether the introduction of the Euro led to more investment and to its more efficient allocation.
That financial integration will ultimately lead to growth seems to be generally accepted. A document describing financial policy of the European Commission states that "The economic benefits of European financial integration are beyond doubt."(European Commission (2005 p. 5)). As evidence, the European Commission points to two studies. The first study is London Economics (2002) which simulates the effects of the reduced cost of capital in a macro model and finds a significant increase in GDP. The key mechanism is that a lower cost of capital increases investment, which in turn increases GDP. The second study is Guiso et al (2004) , who try to quantify the effect of financial integration on growth. They argue that financial integration facilitates financial development for the less financially developed countries. They draw on the large "finance and growth" literature that established a positive link between financial development and growth.
1 Using a number of simulations they find that the "growth dividend" from financial integration in Europe is substantial -especially for the currently less financially developed countries. Guiso et al. are, however, silent on the exact channels through which financial integration affects growth.
My strategy is to look at the two channels through which financial integration is expected to lead to growth. My approach is therefore more structural than that of the two studies above. If financial integration does not lead to either more investment or to its better allocation, then there is little hope for financial integration to lead to growth through other channels. Another aspect of my strategy is to use the Euro's introduction as a one-time increase in the degree of financial integration. Financial integration is normally a gradual process, but the introduction of the Euro is an event which may provide the statistical power to estimate its effects. The adoption of the common currency has eliminated exchange rate risk, lowered information barriers and increased liquidity in financial markets. Since the Euro facilitates financial integration, I ,in part, interpret its effects as the effects of financial integration.
I use panel data on 27 industries in 17 countries for ten yeas. The time period covers five years prior to and five years following the introduction of the Euro. It includes countries that adopted the Euro as well as those that did not. In my baseline specification I regress the growth rate of investment on time, country and industry fixed effects and a dummy indicating the years and countries in which the Euro was used as the official currency. The coefficient on the Euro is the difference in differences estimator of the effect of the Euro on the growth rate of investment. I
find that the Euro is associated with an increase in the growth rate of investment of about five percentage points. This effect is extremely robust and persists even after controlling for aggregate stock returns, changes in interest rates, GDP growth and other factors. The effect also appears to be greatest immediately following the Euro's introduction in 1999 and then gradually declines.
The impact of the Euro on investment should not be uniform across countries and across industries. If the Euro opens the door to large and liquid financial markets, then countries with previously low levels of financial development should benefit more than countries that already had developed financial markets. I find that the impact of the Euro is no greater in countries with previously low levels of financial development. This suggests that the Euro enhances the workings of financial markets in all countries -not just in those that are financially less developed. Thus, one of the main predictions of Guisso et al that the growth dividend will be larger in financially less developed countries is not supported by my findings of the Euro's effect on investment.
The impact of the Euro also varies by industry. Financial integration particularly benefits financially constrained firms or firms which depend heavily on external finance. If these characteristics vary across industries, then the Euro's impact should also vary across industries. I use a number of industry characteristics including an index of dependence on external finance, average establishment size, investment, R&D and export intensities. I find that the Euro's impact is greater in industries that depend on external finance -evidence consistent with the Euro facilitating financial development, and with the prediction of Guisso et al that financially dependent industries benefit most from financial integration.
I find no evidence that the Euro has led to a more efficient allocation of capital. I do find that investment tends to flow to industries with high multifactor and capital productivity growth. This tendency, however, does not change after the introduction of the Euro. This is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the Euro and the associated financial market integration will improve the efficiency of capital allocation.
My paper is closely related to Bris, Koskinen and Nilsson (2005) who show that after 1999, firms in Euro countries invested more than firms in non-Euro countries. The difference is that I use sectoral instead of firm-level data, and that in addition to investigating the effect of the Euro on investment, I examine the Euro's effect on the efficiency of investment. Also, while they focus on the difference between the effect of the Euro in weak and strong currency countries, I emphasize the variation of Euro's effect according to different levels of financial development and industry dependence on external finance. My results confirm those of Bris et. al. that the Euro has led to a substantial increase in investment.
Another paper on real effects of the Euro is Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) who find that the link between national investment and savings has recently weakened in Europe, and especially in the EMU. This confirms that the EMU countries are becoming financially integrated, and that this integration has real effects on choices of consumers and investors.
I also build on the literature documenting the financial integration in Europe and the role played by the common currency in facilitating this integration. For example, Sentana (2000) and Hardouvelis, Malliaropulos and Priestly (2000) find that financial integration leads to a lower cost of capital. It is reasonable to ask if the lower cost of capital had any real effects and spurred investment.
Similarly, the boom in corporate bond issuance reported by Pagano (2004) or the reduction in underwriting fees reported by Santos and Tsatsaronis (2003) is expected to allow firms to raise more funds for investment. In addition, the competition and shifts in portfolio allocation as reported by Adam et al. (2002) p. 36-37 would lead investment to its most productive use. Whether these developments led to higher and more efficient investment is the subject of this paper.
Data
I use data from the STAN database published by the OECD. STAN includes annual industry level data for most of the OECD countries. The available information includes production, value added, labor input and investment. I use data on 10 Euro and 7 non-Euro countries. Of the Euro countries
Ireland is excluded because it is not available in STAN, and Luxembourg is excluded because it has no data on investment. Also excluded due to insufficient investment data are New Zealand and Japan. The list of countries and the number of observation for each country appears in As a measure of industry output I use the growth rate of real value added (STAN code VALUK).
I also calculate three measures of productivity growth. Labor productivity growth is the difference between the growth of real value added and the growth of total employment (STAN code EMPN).
The second measure of productivity growth is the difference between the growth of real value and the growth rate of real net capital stock (STAN code NCAPK). I call this capital productivity growth.
Finally, multi-factor productivity growth is the difference between the growth of real value added and the weighted average of employment and real capital stock growth. I also use a number of industry characteristics. The first is an index of dependence on external finance (RZ) as constructed by Rajan and Zingales (1998 
Estimation

Does the Euro lead to more investment?
My goal is to measure the effect of the common currency on investment. We see in Table I that average investment growth before the Euro's introduction was lower than in the years after. It is possible that the high investment growth prior to 1999 was driven by the world-wide investment boom of the late 1990s and that the decline in investment afterwards had nothing to do with the Euro's introduction. Clearly, investment is in large part driven by business cycles. Also, in Table I we see that on average, investment growth in Euro countries was lower than in non-Euro countries.
It is possible that the Euro countries typically invest less that the non-Euro countries. For example, Germany has had a low investment growth for the past decade -both before and after the Euro's introduction.
In order to measure the effect of the Euro on investment growth, we need to evaluate the change in the investment growth in Euro countries relative to the change in the investment growth in nonEuro countries. In other words, we need a difference in differences estimator. The panel nature of my data is ideally suited for this task. First, I include fixed year effects to control for factors that vary over time but which are common across countries (e.g. the world-wide investment boom in the late 1990s). Second, I include country fixed effects to control for factors that vary across countries but which are constant over time (e.g. the sluggish investment growth in Germany). Finally, I
include industry effects to control for the fact that some industries (e.g. telecommunications) grow faster than others. The baseline specification is as follows:
where I i,j,t is the growth rate of investment in industry i, country j and year t, φ i , ψ j and ω t are industry, country and year fixed effects, and Euro is a dummy variable equal to one in years and countries in which the Euro is the official currency. The coefficient of interest is β. It is the difference between the expected growth rate of investment after and before the introduction of the Euro conditional on a typical investment in a given country, year and industry. If the Euro spurs investment, then β should be positive and significant. I assume that the error terms ε i,j,t are independent across countries but may be correlated within countries -across industries and over time. This addresses the possible serial correlation in residuals that often plagues the difference in differences estimates as pointed out by Bertrand, Duflo, Mullainathan (2004) .
I expand the baseline specification to control for a number of macroeconomic factors that typically appear in investment equations. First, I include lagged GDP growth to capture aggregate business cycle fluctuations as in accelerator models of investment of Clark (1979) or Acemoglu (1993). Second, I include aggregate stock market returns which serve both as a proxy for Tobin's q as well as a financial accelerator. Third, I include lagged interest rates and lagged changes in interest rates. Olympic Games) I include the interactions between industry and country dummies.
4 Table II shows the results. The first column shows the estimates of equation (1). The estimate of β is positive and statistically significant. It shows that investment growth in countries that adopted the Euro is 6.7 percentage points higher than it would have been otherwise. Given the average value of investment growth of 4%, I regard this effect as large and economically significant. The effect is also about 4 percentage points larger than that found in Bris et. al. In specification (2) I control for the macroeconomic variables: aggregate stock returns, lagged interest rates, lagged changes in interest rates, lagged log of GDP per capita and lagged GDP growth. With these controls the magnitude of β drops somewhat but remains statistically and economically significant.
In specifications (3) and (4) I include interaction terms between the year and industry dummies.
The coefficient on the Euro dummy remains statistically significant and of similar magnitude. The magnitude drops when macroeconomic controls are added, but the coefficient again remains statistically and economically significant. The inclusion of the interaction terms increases the R-squared to 0.12. In specifications (5) and (6) I include interaction terms between the industry and country dummies. The results regarding the effect of the Euro remain unchanged. The same is true when both sets of interactions are included.
In order to check if the effect of the Euro on investment is robust, I re-estimate some of the specifications from Table II using and 85). In all cases the effect of the Euro remains both statistically and economically significant.
Does the impact of the Euro vary over time?
I examine if the effects of the Euro are different in different years. Instead of including one Euro dummy as in equation (1) 
where s=1999, ..., 2003; and β s is the effect of the Euro in year s.
The results appear in Table IV The gradual decline in the impact of the Euro on investment growth stands in contrast with with the Euro's effect on trade. Both Micco, Stein and Ordoñez (2003) and Flam and Nordstrom (2003) find that the Euro's positive effect on trade is greater in later years than immediately following the Euro's introduction. The immediate impact of the Euro is consistent with a rapid transformation of financial markets in the Euro countries. Perhaps the elimination of exchange rate risk and the instant emergence of booming corporate bond market spurred investment immediately following the Euro's introduction. I find no evidence of reversals in investment. While investment growth in Euro countries slows after 1999 it never turns negative. Thus, the the Euro's initial effect on investment is permanent. If the nearly 10 percentage points larger investment growth in Euro countries was partly a result of euphoria over the common currency, the firms do not appear to have scaled back investment once the euphoria had passed.
Does the impact of the Euro vary across countries?
To investigate whether the effect of the Euro varies across countries I replace the single Euro dummy with a set of ten interactions between the Euro dummy and the ten Euro countries. For example, Euro * Austria equals one if the observation is for Austria and between 1999 and 2003. The baseline specification can be written as:
where k indexes the 10 EMU countries and β k is the Euro's effect in country k.
The results are presented in Table V . The effect of the Euro is statistically significant in most countries whether or not I include the macroeconomic controls or year/country/industry dummy interactions. The largest effect appears in Austria and France with a magnitude ranging from 9.9 to 11.8 percentage points. The effects are also strong and robust in Germany, Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands. In Portugal the effect is significant only at the 10% level when macroeconomic controls are included. The effect of the Euro is significant in Italy and Greece only when macro controls are excluded. In Finland, the effect of the Euro appears insignificant.
If the Euro facilitates financial development in the less financially developed countries, its effect should be higher in those countries. Euro countries with historically low levels of financial development should experience higher growth than countries with historically well developed financial markets. The last three columns of this may be due to high colinearity rather than to the absence of structural differences. Only the interaction between Euro and market capitalization is statistically significant at 10 percent when country/industry and year/industry interactions are excluded. The coefficient is negative, providing suggestive evidence that the effect of the Euro is larger in countries with a low level of stock market development.
Does the impact of the Euro vary across industries?
There is ample evidence that the effects of financial development vary across firm or industry characteristics. Most notably, Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that financial development affects industries that depend on external finance. If the Euro facilitates financial development, its effects should also vary across industries. Similarly to the previous two subsections, I replace the Euro dummy with a set of 27 interactions between the Euro dummy and an industry dummy indicator. For example, Euro * Agriculture equals one if the observation is for agriculture in years and countries in which the Euro is the official currency. The baseline specification can be written as:
where β i is the effect of Euro on investment in industry i. 
where X i,j is the value of one of the five industry characteristics in industry i and country j, and γ X measures how the effect of Euro varies with industry characteristic X.
The rationale for including the RZ measure is straightforward: if the Euro improves the workings of financial markets, it should primarily help industries that depend on external finance. I include the R&D measure partly because it is correlated with the RZ measure and is available for more industries than RZ. Industries with the need for large R&D investment depend on financial markets to finance this investment. Of course, an industry's need for R&D does not mean that it will have high R&D expenditures, especially if external finance is unavailable. 7 Nonetheless, I expect the Euro to spur investment in R&D intensive industries. Similarly, I also expect the Euro to spur investment in investment intensive industries as measured by Inv. I also examine if the effect of the Euro varies by size. On the one hand, it is well known that small firms tend to be financially constrained (Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) ). If Euro improves the workings of the financial market it should allow small firms which were previously financially constrained to invest more. On the other hand, Bartram and Karolyi (2004) find that the reduction in market risk following the introduction of the Euro is greatest for large firms -hence larger firms should benefit more. In addition, the financial integration spurred by the Euro has been more intense in equity and bond markets than in banking (Vives (2001) and Schoenmaker and Oosterloo (2005) ). Since it is primarily large firms that tap equity and bond markets, it could again be large firms that benefit from the Euro. Therefore, how size affects the Euro's impact is ambiguous. Finally, I look at the effect of export intensity on the Euro's impact on investment. I expect the export intensive industries to invest more since a common currency reduces the cost of international trade.
The RZ measure is constant over time and across countries. For example, the RZ index is the same for basic metals industry in all countries. The assumption is that an industry's technological The coefficients on the interactions between Euro and other industry characteristics are insignificant. Therefore, the Euro seems to boost investment equally in industries with various R&D and investment intensities as well as in industries with various sizes of establishments. The coefficient on the interaction between the Euro and export intensity Exp is negative and statistically significant at 10 percent level. This suggests that the effect of the Euro is lower in export intensive industries. This is puzzling since there is evidence that Euro increased trade both within and outside of EMU countries (Micco, Stein and Ordonez (2003) , Flam and Nordstrom (2003) ). If the Euro increases trade it should also increase investment in export intensive industries. One possibility, suggested by Bris at al., is that a common currency eliminates the possibility of competitive depreciations and therefore export industries in weak currency countries may invest less as a result.
Does the Euro lead to a more efficient allocation of capital?
Measuring the efficiency of investment allocation is difficult. Capital is allocated efficiently if its (2000) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) . Wurgler calculates the elasticity of investment with respect to output in order to evaluate the efficiency of financial markets across countries. Maksimovic and Phillips calculate the elasticity of investment with respect to shipments and different productivity measures in order to evaluate the efficiency of investment allocation within conglomerates.
8 These approaches are non-structural but have the advantage of being simple, intuitive and transparent. In contrast, the approaches that use Tobin's q critically depend on our ability to accurately estimate q. In order to evaluate the impact of the Euro on investment efficiency I estimate the elasticities of investment with respect to value added and productivity measures before and after the introduction of the Euro. If the Euro leads to more efficient investment, elasticities after its introduction should be higher than before. The baseline specification can be written as follows:
where Q i,j,t is either value added growth, labor, capital or multifactor growth, η is the elasticity of investment with respect to value added growth or the three productivity measures before the markets. An alternative interpretation is that firms increased investment because they expected their earnings to grow with increased trade. While this may be part of the explanation, there are at least three strikes against it. First, I find no evidence that export-intensive industries increased their investment more than other industries. Second, I do find that the Euro had a bigger impact in industries that depend on external finance. This suggests that the Euro's impact had something to do with financial markets rather than trade. Finally, Bris, Koskinen and Nilsson (2004) find that expected earnings of companies in the Euro area did not increase following the Euro's introduction.
I find no evidence that the introduction of the Euro increased the efficiency of capital allocation.
Integrated financial markets are more competitive and hence should force financial institutions to identify and finance only the most productive investment opportunities. Indeed, there is evidence that competition in the financial sector in Europe has intensified (see for example Galati and Tsatsaronis (2003) ). However, I find no evidence that the introduction of the Euro was associated with a tighter link between output, productivity and investment. At the same time, it is important to note that contemporaneous output or productivity growth may not capture the true marginal product of capital. Therefore, better measures of the efficiency of capital allocation need to be used in future research. The dependent variable is the growth rate of real investment. Euro is a dummy variable equal to one for years and countries in which Euro is used as the official currency. All specifications include year, country and industry fixed effects. Macroeconomic controls include aggregate stock returns, lagged GDP growth, lagged interest rates, lagged change in interest rates and per capita GDP. T-statistics calculated using robust and country "clustered" standard errors are in parentheses. A * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 % levels.
(1) 
Table III Does the Euro lead to more investment? Robustness
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real investment. Euro is a dummy variable equal to one for years and countries in which Euro is used as the official currency. All specifications include year, country and industry fixed effects. Macroeconomic controls include aggregate stock returns, lagged GDP growth, lagged interest rates, lagged change in interest rates and per capita GDP. T-statistics calculated using robust and country "clustered" standard errors are in parentheses. A * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 % levels.
(1) The dependent variable is the growth rate of real investment. Euro is a dummy variable equal to one for years and countries in which Euro is used as the official currency. All specifications include year, country and industry dummies. Macroeconomic controls include aggregate stock returns, lagged GDP growth, lagged interest rates, lagged change in interest rates and per capita GDP. T-statistics calculated using robust and country "clustered" standard errors are in parentheses. A * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 % levels.
Table V Does the impact of the Euro vary across countries?
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real investment. Euro is a dummy variable equal to one for years and countries in which Euro is used as the official currency. All specifications include year, country and industry fixed effects. Macroeconomic controls include aggregate stock returns, lagged GDP growth, lagged interest rates, lagged change in interest rates and per capita GDP. T-statistics calculated using robust and country "clustered" standard errors are in parentheses. A * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 % levels. The dependent variable is the growth rate of real investment. Euro is a dummy variable equal to one for years and countries in which Euro is used as the official currency. LowF D is a dummy variable that equals one for Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. All specifications include country, year and industry fixed effects and the interactions between industry and year effects, and industry and country effects. Each specification also includes macroeconomic controls: aggregate stock returns, lagged GDP growth, lagged interest rates, lagged change in interest rates and per capita GDP. T-statistics calculated using robust and country "clustered" standard errors are in parentheses. A * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 % levels.
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Table VII Does the impact of the Euro vary across industries?
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real investment. Euro is a dummy variable equal to one for years and countries in which Euro is used as the official currency. All specifications include country, year and industry fixed effects and the interactions between industry and year effects, and industry and country effects. Each specification also includes macroeconomic controls: aggregate stock returns, lagged GDP growth, lagged interest rates, lagged change in interest rates and per capita GDP. T-statistics are calculated using robust and country "clustered" standard errors. A * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 % levels. The dependent variable is the growth rate of real investment. Euro is a dummy variable equal to one for years and countries in which Euro is used as the official currency. RZ is a measure of industry dependence on external finance from Rajan and Zinglaes (1998) .
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RD, Inv and
Exp are the shares of R&D expenditures, investment and exports in value added. LowF D is a dummy variable that equals one for Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. All specifications include country, year and industry fixed effects and the interactions between industry and year effects, and industry and country effects. Each specification also includes macroeconomic controls: aggregate stock returns, lagged GDP growth, lagged interest rates, lagged change in interest rates and per capita GDP. T-statistics calculated using robust and country "clustered" standard errors are in parentheses. A * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 % levels.
(1)
(8) The dependent variable is the growth rate of real investment. Euro is a dummy variable equal to one for years and countries in which Euro is used as the official currency. LowF D is a dummy variable that equals one for Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. All specifications include country, year and industry fixed effects and the interactions between industry and year effects, and industry and country effects. Each specification also includes macroeconomic controls: aggregate stock returns, lagged GDP growth, lagged interest rates, lagged change in interest rates and per capita GDP. T-statistics calculated using robust and country "clustered" standard errors are in parentheses. A * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 % levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) The number of observations is the number of non-missing observations for investment growth. The number of industries is the number of industries for which the country has at least one observation. The number of years is the number of years for which the country has at least one observation. Table A 
.2 The number of observations and industry characteristics
The number of observations is the number of non-missing observations for investment growth. The number of industries is the number of industries for which the country has at least one observation. The number of years is the number of years for which the country has at least one observation. Investment growth is the growth of real gross fixed capital formation (STAN code GFCFK). Value added growth is the growth of value added (STAN code VALUK). Multifactor productivity growth is is the difference between the growth of real value added and the weighted average of employment and real capital stock growth. The weight on employment growth is the labor's share in value added (LABR/VALU). One minus the labor's share is the weight on the growth of real capital stock. Labor productivity growth is the difference between the growth of real value added and the growth of total employment (STAN code EMPN). Capital productivity growth is the difference between the growth of real value and the growth rate of real net capital stock (STAN code NCAPK). RZ is the index of dependence on external finance as constructed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) . R&D is research and development intensity, calculated as share of R&D expenditures in value added. Inv is investment intensity, calculated as share of gross fixed capital formation in value added (GFCK/VALU in STAN codes). Size is total employment divided by the number of establishments. Exp is export intensity, calculated as the share of exports in value added (EXP/VALU in STAN codes). 
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